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Channels, benefits and risks of public–private 
interactions for knowledge transfer: conceptual 
framework inspired by Latin America  
Valeria Arza 
There are both benefits and risks involved in interactions between public research organisations 
(PROs) and industry. This paper proposes a conceptual framework that associates firms’ and PROs’ 
motivations, channels of interaction and benefits. It suggests that each channel triggers predominant 
types of benefits and claims that policy-making to support PRO–industry (PRO-I) interactions should 
be selective. Policy design must take into consideration the skill-related characteristics of the actors, 
and the characteristics of the interaction channels in order to achieve the best possible balance between 
the benefits and risks of PRO-I interactions. The geographical focus of the discussion is Latin America. 
NTERACTIONS THAT OCCUR BETWEEN 
the private sector and PROs have the potential to 
create and diffuse knowledge, but imply some 
risks related mainly to the privatisation of public re-
search outputs and also to the diversion of the re-
search agenda away from socially more useful 
purposes. Most of the literature on PRO-I interac-
tions designed to inform policy either supports or 
disapproves the promotion of more intense linkages. 
In fact, there have been very few attempts in this  
literature to distinguish the particularities of interac-
tions using different channels.  
This paper discusses the channels of PRO-I inter-
actions and the associated benefits and risks in  
developing countries, with a focus on Latin Amer-
ica. We make two main claims. First, the channel of 
PRO-I interaction used by firms and researchers is 
defined by the specific combination of goals that 
motivates the interaction. Secondly, since the bene-
fits of interactions are generally in line with the  
initial motivation, certain channels of interactions 
are more likely to result in certain types of benefits 
for each of the actors (i.e. firm and PRO). Similarly, 
the risks associated with PRO-I interactions vary  
depending on the interaction channel. 
We believe that this paper is relevant to science 
and technology policy (STP) because it discusses the 
pros and cons of certain channels of interactions be-
ing promoted rather than others in order to achieve 
particular benefits and avoid some of the risks. 
Jointly assessing the benefits and risks is essential  
if PRO-I interactions are to work to upgrade the 
overall national system of innovation (NSI). 
The paper is organised into five sections. The 
second section highlights the specificities of PRO-I 
interactions in Latin America. The third section ad-
vances the discussion on the motivations and bene-
fits of PRO-I interaction and proposes a conceptual 
framework which relates the motivations, interaction 
channels and benefits. The fourth section extends the 
conceptual framework to consider the potential so-
cial risks of PRO-I interaction. Finally, specific  
hypotheses are derived, which are then tested in the 
I 
Valeria Arza, Argentinian National Council for Science and 
Technology Research (CONICET), Research Centre for Trans-
formation (CENIT), Callao 796 6to, (1023) Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, Argentina; Website: www.fund-cenit.org.ar; Email: 
varza@fund-cenit.org.ar. 
I am grateful for useful comments on a previous version of 
this paper from Claudia Vazquez, Andrés López, Glenda Kruss, 
Jo Lorentzen, Keun Lee and Jong-Hak Eun. The methodological 
appendix was enriched by discussions with Gabriela Dutrénit 
and Claudia de Fuentes. Finally, I would like to acknowledge 
the comments of two anonymous referees. The usual disclaim-
ers apply. CONICET, Argentina, IDRC (International Devel-
opment Research Centre), Canada, and La Ville de Paris (City 
Government of Paris), France contributed funding for this 
project. 
A conceptual framework for public–private interactions in Latin America 
 
 Science and Public Policy August 2010 474 
empirical contributions in this special issue of  
Science and Public Policy.1  
PRO-I interactions in developing countries, 
with focus on Latin America 
Most of the theoretical and empirical research on 
PRO-I interactions focuses on developed economies. 
However, the requirements for developing countries 
to upgrade their NSIs are different from those in de-
veloped countries (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007), as 
are their PRO-I interactions.  
First, the socio-economic needs are different. 
Unlike the usual reality in developed countries, large 
fractions of the population in developing countries 
live in poverty. Moreover, the income distribution is 
highly unequal, and education and health systems 
are deficient, which perpetuates social inequality. 
Furthermore, the level of pollution, largely the result 
of outdated production technologies, is distressing.  
All these features create specific demands on 
PROs, which are often not comparable to the de-
mands of economic activity in developed countries. 
As Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007) claim, the key to 
catching up is research that is useful for the individ-
ual country. Thus, research needs to be oriented to 
the social needs of users. However, in a context 
where many technology users are poor, which means 
that their needs may not be converted into effective 
market demand, the demand exerted by private firms 
on PROs may not agree with the needs of the majority 
(Ravjee, 2002). 
Secondly, both PROs and firms in developing 
countries have specific and distinctive characteristics 
compared to their counterparts in developed  
countries. A strong scientific base is a prerequisite 
for catching up, as historical experience shows 
(Mazzoleni, 2008). For example, Liefner and 
Schiller (2008) claim that among academic institu-
tions in developing countries there are no synergies in 
terms of the three missions of teaching, research and 
outreach (including PRO-I interactions). According 
to Liefner and Schiller, one of the characteristics  
of these institutions is the fragmentation of their  
various functions.  
Although there is a long tradition of good quality 
scientific research in many Latin American PROs,2 
there is also evidence of functional fragmentation 
between research, teaching and outreach activities. 
Moreover, STP has not been consistent over time 
and, consequently, the developmental role assigned 
to PROs has not been continuous.3 In this context, 
the promotion of PRO–firm interactions, although 
emphasised more since the 1990s, has not been part 
of an integrated STP plan, but the result of isolated 
policy actions, usually seeking economic benefits for 
the under-funded PROs.4  
Similarly, the average technological dynamism of 
firms in developing countries cannot be compared to 
that of similar firms in developed countries. PRO-I 
interactions can be effective only if there is proactive 
demand for knowledge in the industry (Mazzoleni 
and Nelson, 2007). Firms’ absorptive capabilities are 
required to exploit external sources of knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and also to diffuse the 
knowledge received from the PRO to other actors in 
the local system (Giuliani and Arza, 2009).  
The literature on PRO-I interactions in Latin 
America often claims that an important limitation for 
the wide diffusion of interactions is lack of industry 
demand for sophisticated technological knowledge,5 
or, at least, poor demand for domestic sources of 
knowledge: foreign firms demand technology from 
their headquarters, and many local firms prefer to 
import technologies (Velho, 2003). Similarly, some 
authors note that the productive structure in Latin 
America is not knowledge intensive and, therefore, 
is deriving fewer benefits from PROs,6 which, in 
turn, means that PROs have fewer opportunities for 
applications.  
In sum, the small literature that specifically stud-
ies PRO-I interactions in developing countries in 
general, and in Latin America in particular, points to 
the idiosyncrasies of firms and PROs and the moti-
vations for PRO-I interactions. None can be assimi-
lated to those in developed countries. This justifies 
the need for more specific research on PRO-I inter-
actions and their benefits in developing countries. 
This special issue tries to fill this gap using the case 
of Latin America.7  
Conceptual framework of relationships  
between motivations, channels of  
interactions and their benefits 
Actors’ motivations for linking 
In order to schematise the analysis, we classify the 
various motivations for interacting into two main 
groups for each actor: economic and intellectual for 
PROs, and passive and proactive for firms. This clas-
sification constitutes the main pillar of our conceptual 
framework. 
It should be noted that, although a two-by-two 
classification of the motivations for interacting  
necessarily involves simplification of the reality, we 
believe it is justified in the Latin American case. In 
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fact, a dichotomy between firms’ passive and proac-
tive strategies is common in the literature on Latin 
American firms. Many argue that a general lack of 
confidence in the sustainability of any state of af-
fairs, due to high macro-economic uncertainty, ex-
plains firms’ defensive (passive) strategies,8 which 
need to be counterbalanced by policies designed to 
reward proactive schemes. Similarly, in the case of 
researchers, it is often argued that Latin American 
PROs (and especially universities) have traditionally 
been disconnected from (and usually opposed to) the 
private sector. However, it has been claimed that the 
increased tendency for researchers to interact with 
firms is due to budget pressures9 (rather than intel-
lectual motivations). 
Motivations for PROs In the case of researchers 
working in PROs, interacting with firms may re-
spond to the PRO’s institutional imperatives or may 
result from researchers’ individual motivations. In 
either case, we can identify two ‘ideal types’ of  
motivations.  
On the one hand, there may be institutional im-
peratives to diversify funding resources for infra-
structure and staff support which drive interaction 
with industry. Researchers may also be seeking to 
complement their personal incomes (i.e. individual 
motivation).10 We refer to these motivations as the 
PRO’s economic strategies.  
On the other hand, PRO-I interaction may be trig-
gered by the primary goals of the PRO to enhance 
the quality of research and teaching by learning in 
the context of application or by learning about pro-
duction technologies which may be useful for further 
research. This strategy could be part of an institu-
tional imperative or respond to the researcher’s per-
sonal ambitions to produce original and high-quality 
research outputs.11 In other words, PRO-I interaction 
may fulfil the PRO’s (and researchers) intellectual 
strategies by, for example, suggesting new avenues 
for exploration, monitoring the latest technological 
developments, tackling challenging problems etc.12  
Motivations for firms In order to cope with accel-
eration in technological change, innovative firms 
need to gain access to the knowledge produced by 
PROs because, in many productive activities, scien-
tific knowledge weighs increasingly more in techno-
logical upgrading. Thus, for many firms, the main 
motivations to interact with PROs are the need to 
‘identify and exploit external and applied techno-
logical opportunities to a full extent’ (Bonaccorsi 
and Piccaluga, 1994: 232). In other words, the  
strategy may be designed to gain access to scientific 
knowledge to enable the firm to become a real inno-
vator (i.e. to push the technological frontier). Of 
course, such a strategy demands a high level of 
knowledge commitment and proactive behaviour on 
the part of the firm, not only to absorb the externally 
produced knowledge, but also to contribute to the 
creation of technological knowledge suitable for 
productive activities. We refer to this firm motiva-
tion for PRO-I interaction as a proactive strategy. In 
this case, PRO-I interaction is a key component of 
the firm’s innovation strategy and interaction will be 
aimed mostly at obtaining and creating updated, and 
usually tacit, knowledge to solve technological  
bottlenecks (Brostrom et al., 2009).  
Other motivations to interact with PROs include 
reducing some development costs (e.g. testing and 
monitoring) or operating costs by substituting inter-
nal innovation or production activities with external 
sources (e.g. gaining access to PRO facilities at sub-
sidised rates) (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga, 1994). In 
this case, the knowledge received will be highly 
codified and mature, and it will not demand very so-
phisticated knowledge resources from the firm, al-
though there is a minimum threshold for knowledge 
from external sources to be absorbed. Thus, PRO-I 
interaction would not necessarily be a component of 
an innovation strategy. Firms would be more inter-
ested in solving concrete and fairly simple, short-
term production problems than thinking in the long-
term. We refer to this type of firm motivation to  
interact with PRO as a passive strategy. 
Benefits of PRO-I interactions 
The literature is generous in identifying the different 
types of benefits that firms and PROs can expect 
from their interactions. We organise them into four 
groups in line with the motivations for linking  
discussed in the previous section: intellectual or eco-
nomic benefits, for PROs; and contributing to inno-
vation strategies or solving short-term production 
problems, for firms. 
Intellectual benefits for PROs Research may be  
inspired by industry applications and knowledge  
exchange with industry (Meyer-Krahmer and 
Schmoch, 1998), which provide new insights for the 
research agenda (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999; Lee, 
2000). This applies particularly to research fields lo-
cated in the ‘Pasteur quadrant’ (Stokes, 1997), which 
advance through simultaneous performance of basic 
and applied research (e.g. all types of engineering, 
biotechnology, metallurgy, computer science etc.). 
Both the quality and quantity of the knowledge pro-
duced by PROs can improve from their responding 
 
Firms and PROs can expect various 
benefits from interacting. There can 
be intellectual or economic benefits, 
for PROs. For firms benefits can 
contribute to innovation strategies or 
solve short-term production problems
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to the opportunities opened up (or problems faced) 
by innovative firms.  
Some scholars have attempted to assess whether 
PROs become more productive in terms of knowledge 
creation (usually measured by publications) from in-
teracting with firms. Most show that collaboration is 
positively associated with research productivity.13  
Economic benefits for PROs In line with the moti-
vations, the literature confirms that obtaining extra 
funds is one important benefit of PRO-I interac-
tion.14 There is also evidence that by commercialis-
ing their research, PROs learn to identify the most 
valuable research from the pool of their inventions 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003) and, therefore,  
become better at raising private funds (i.e. a self-
reinforcing mechanism is in place).  
Benefits related to firms’ long-term innovation 
strategies Some problems faced by industry de-
mand a combination of technologies that no single 
firm could develop on its own, but which can be 
solved by exploiting the knowledge stock in PROs 
(Patel and Pavitt, 1995). Thus, PRO-I interactions 
contribute to firms’ innovation strategies, leading to 
innovative outcomes. Moreover, the technological 
upgrading of linked firms may be conducive to 
broader economic and social development due to 
knowledge spill-overs.15  
Benefits related to short-term production activities 
by firms PROs widen the capacity of industry to 
solve real production problems. First, universities 
provide training for graduates who then take up  
employment and contribute to production and inno-
vative activities in the private sector (Rosenberg and 
Nelson, 1994). This occurs even if the PROs do not 
strategically orient their teaching programmes to 
topics that industry considers relevant. Furthermore, 
PROs develop new laboratory instruments and ana-
lytic methodologies that constitute fundamental in-
puts for industry (Rosenberg, 1992). Finally, PROs 
produce knowledge related to the economic and  
social context in which firms produce and trade, 
which could influence the ultimate success of their 
production decisions (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). 
Conceptual framework 
The analytical framework proposed in this section 
combines the motivations for firms and researchers 
discussed in the section of this paper on the actors’ 
motivations for linking, highlighting specific chan-
nels of interactions that best serve each combination 
of motivations. Moreover, since it is benefits that are 
associated with the initial motivations for interact-
ing, we show that each channel of interaction creates 
a predominant, specific combination of benefits. 
Figure 1 depicts the motivations of firms and 
PROs. The vertical axis represents PROs strategies 
and the horizontal axis represents firms’ strategies. 
These strategies are not dichotomous and should be 
read as a continuum between two extremes: at the 
extreme for PROs are intellectual strategies (i.e. 
learning in the context of application) and economic 
strategies (i.e. accessing new sources of funding); at 
the extreme ends for firms are proactive and passive 











































Figure 1. Motivations and channels of interaction 
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four extremes, depicted in the four quadrants in  
Figure 1. 
 Quadrant (I) contains interactions motivated by 
economic strategies by PROs and passive strate-
gies by firms. The result is interactions that could 
be associated with the provision of scientific and 
technological services in exchange for money, 
where knowledge flows mainly from PROs to 
firms (e.g. consultancy, use of equipment for 
quality control, testing and monitoring etc.). 
These are usually short-tem interactions. Al-
though there may be some degree of personal in-
teraction, much of the knowledge transmitted is 
mature and can be transferred without intense 
face-to-face collaboration. 
 Quadrant (II) is defined by the intellectual strate-
gies of the PRO and the passive strategies of the 
firms. We refer to it as the traditional channel be-
cause it resembles the traditional ways that firms 
benefit from actities by PROs (e.g. hiring gradu-
ates, conferences, publications etc.). Knowledge 
flows mainly from PROs to firms, but the knowl-
edge content is defined by the traditional func-
tions of the academic/research institutions. 
Personal interaction between the individuals from 
the different institutions is not required in this 
case.  
 Quadrant (III) includes interactions that originate 
from the intellectual strategies of the PROs and 
proactive strategies by the firms. In this case the 
knowledge flow is bi-directional and the potential 
for joint learning is high. This quadrant includes 
joint research and development projects, partici-
pation in networks, scientific–technological parks 
etc. Generally, personal interaction is required 
throughout the period of the interaction agreement 
(usually more than one year). 
 Quadrant (IV) is defined by the economic strate-
gies of PROs and proactive strategies by firms. 
This is the commercial channel of interactions, 
where the main motivations for PROs are the 
keenness to commercialise their scientific results. 
Emblematic examples of this channel are spin-off 
companies and incubators. Also included are 
technology licensing and firms’ exclusive rights 
on patented products or processes, whose inven-
tion is based on PRO-I interactions. Personal in-
teraction is usually required in the first stages of 
the relationship when the parties have to agree on 
the type of knowledge that is being commercial-
ised. Also, it is argued in the literature that this 
channel is more effective when systematic and  
direct relations between institutional members are 
established.17 
 
The originality of this framework lies in the use of the 
motivations of the PROs and firms as the relevant di-
mensions for classifying PRO-I interactions. This 
helps us to relate the channels of interactions to the 
benefits triggered by the interactions. The literature 
highlights the existence of a variety of forms of PRO-I 
interactions (Bekkers and Freitas, 2008; D’Este and 
Patel, 2007). Channels have been classified according 
to the degree of formality in the organisational 
agreements,18 the degree of articulation and personal 
communication between the actors,19 and the relative 
potential for conveying novelty.20 It is also argued 
that the intensity of use of different forms of interac-
tion is sector, field and/or technology specific.21 The 
literature on channels of PRO-I interactions mainly 
analyses what determines the use of different chan-
nels22 or identifies the variety and relative frequency 
of the use of different channels by specific actors.23 It 
tends to overlook the relation between channels of in-
teractions and the benefits they potentially trigger. 24  
In classifying channels according to the original 
motivation we are one step away from relating 
channels to benefits. Table 1 presents hypotheses on 
the relations between channels and benefits.  We 
claim that different channels prioritise some types of 
benefits over others. This does not mean that each 
channel triggers only one/some types of benefits: 
rather it means that, ceteris paribus, each channel 
predominantly contributes to certain types of bene-
fits for the actors, more explicitly, those that corre-
spond to the initial motivations for interacting.  
Thus, it would be expected that traditional and bi-
directional channels should yield intellectual bene-
fits for PROs, and service and commercial channels 
Table 1. Predominant benefits expected from channels of PRO-I interactions
Channels Benefits 
PROs Firms  




Service  X X  
Traditional X  X  
Bi-directional X   X 
Commercial  X  X 
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would yield economic benefits for PROs. For firms, 
bi-directional and commercial channels may be the 
most effective way to convey novelty and, therefore, 
to facilitate technological upgrading. These channels 
involve a higher level of articulation than other 
channels, promoting the transmission of tacit knowl-
edge (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). Tacit knowledge 
usually conveys more novelty than explicit/codified 
knowledge because the latter is less costly and, 
therefore, diffuses widely. Thus, PRO-I interactions 
using these channels are expected to be more condu-
cive to innovation outcomes for firms.  
In contrast, since the traditional and the service 
channels generally involve the diffusion of codified 
and mature knowledge, it is less likely that interac-
tions using these channels will contribute to path-
breaking solutions. Yet, they may provide insights 
for marginal improvements of processes or products.  
Finally, the relationship between channels and 
benefits is expected to be mediated by firms’ inno-
vative capabilities and researchers’ knowledge 
skills.  
The literature is very clear about the positive role 
of a firm’s capabilities to increase the effectiveness 
of any interaction.25 Firms need to have achieved a 
minimum threshold of internal capabilities to be able 
to absorb and integrate external knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge obtained through the traditional and  
service channels). If firms are to be proactive in the 
process of knowledge creation (i.e. if they use the bi-
directional and commercial channels), the threshold 
is likely to be higher.  
For PROs, the effect of knowledge skills on bene-
fits may depend on the channel of interaction. As 
pointed out above, researchers who interact with 
PROs have frequently been found to be the best 
qualified or most productive in terms of publica-
tions. Second-tier PROs or researchers with lower 
quality skills may also interact with industry. How-
ever, these interactions are usually different in  
nature and are aimed mainly at solving simple and 
immediate problems (Fukugawa, 2005; Mansfield 
and Lee, 1996). In this case, interactions may target 
knowledge diffusion rather than knowledge creation. 
In fact, researchers with less sophisticated knowl-
edge skills probably have few opportunities and little 
interest in, or ability to, undertake ‘blue skies’ re-
search. They may prefer to be involved in less ambi-
tious research, more oriented towards problem-
solving for industry (D’Este and Patel, 2007), 
through consultancies or other services.  
In sum, knowledge skills are important factors 
mediating the effectiveness of the PRO-I interac-
tions through the bi-directional (Fukugawa, 2005) 
and commercial channels (Lockett et al., 2005; 
Wright et al., 2008). In those cases the contribution 
made by the knowledge is highly relevant to convey 
the novelty that may solve technological bottlenecks. 
However, benefits can still be obtained by lower-
skilled researchers who choose to use the service or 
traditional channels.  
Extending the conceptual framework to achieve 
more relevant policy recommendations:  
social risks of PRO-I interactions 
Since the 1990s, the governments of many countries 
have attempted to improve the relations between 
PROs and firms (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Etzko-
witz et al., 2005; Nelson, 2004; Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997) in the expectation that strong and widely dif-
fused PRO-I interactions would strengthen innovation 
in the NSI. In the case of the Latin American countries, 
the impetus to support those relations was accompa-
nied by the imperative to increase and diversify 
sources of funding for PROs, which were facing seri-
ous cuts to their budgets (Arocena and Sutz, 2005). 
Our conceptual framework demonstrates that 
PRO-I interactions can give rise to different types of 
benefits, depending mainly on the channels used. 
The claim that the benefits to be gained through the 
interactions are not necessarily homogeneous sug-
gests the need for more targeted support for specific 
channels of interactions according to the policy ob-
jectives. We would claim, therefore, that the rele-
vance of our conceptual framework, if validated by 
empirical data, is that it is rooted in the contribution 
to a better and more informed policy design that  
optimises the promotion of PRO-I interactions. 
However, our conceptual framework only ex-
plores the private benefits reaped by PROs and 
firms, assuming somehow that these benefits exceed 
their private costs associated with interactions, 
which explains the initial decisions to interact. How-
ever, some recent studies highlight a series of poten-
tial costs (i.e. risks) involved in PRO-I interactions 
that may affect the creation and diffusion of knowl-
edge in the NSI as a whole (i.e. social risks). Since 
policy recommendations cannot be derived without 
analysing the social risks of the interactions, we 
need to extend our conceptual framework to explore 
the extent to which they may be associated with the 
use of specific channels.  
This section discusses the literature that identifies 
social risks related to the intensification of PRO-I in-
teractions. These risks do not necessarily directly af-
fect the actors involved in interactions, but may 
induce adverse effects on the quality and effective-
ness of knowledge production and diffusion by the 
NSI as a whole. They must therefore be considered 
in any policy analysis. We classify them into four 
groups and end this section of this paper with a dis-
cussion of whether or not each channel of interaction 
implies specific types and levels of risks. 
First, there is the question of the quality of the re-
search that is triggered by PRO-I interactions. Two 
risks emerge: the risk of unethical behaviour due to 
conflicts of interest and the risk of attention being 
diverted away from research that is socially more 
useful.  
 The integrity and quality of teaching and research 
comes under threat when interactions create  
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conflicts of interest between these activities, and 
the needs of the funders. It has been shown that, es-
pecially in the area of clinical research, interactions 
may induce researchers to hide research outputs 
that conflict with the interests of private funders.26  
 PRO-I interactions involve the risk of diverting at-
tention away from certain research lines towards 
those that serve the needs of those with market 
power (Parkinson and Langley, 2009). This implies 
that research carried out in PROs could be re-
oriented in directions that benefit linked firms (and 
perhaps also some consumers and other intercon-
nected firms), but which do not necessarily meet 
the needs of the majority of the population.27 This 
is a particular risk in the context of high inequali-
ties in income, such as occur in Latin America. 
Secondly, there may be opportunity costs when the 
time devoted to interaction implies less time for 
teaching and research, or when the research aban-
doned due to a changed research agenda resulting 
from PRO-I interaction, would have been of higher 
social value than the research actually pursued. Most 
of the literature on opportunity costs in research dis-
cusses whether, by interacting, researchers at PROs 
reduce the time devoted to fundamental (basic) re-
search.28 However, opportunity costs are more often 
an issue of concern in relation to training students.29 
It is claimed that the quality of training is reduced 
because students are pushed to be involved in the 
PRO-I interactions of their research groups. This 
implies that they become less autonomous, have less 
opportunity to explore their own research paths, and 
are in danger of becoming too specialised too soon: 
all of which will undermine the quality and inde-
pendence of research in future generations. This 
concern is particularly relevant when interactions are 
motivated by financial constraints in PRO, which, 
again, often applies to Latin American PROs. 
Thirdly, there is the risk of privatisation of public 
research outputs. In their interactions with industry 
PROs produce useful research outputs to continue 
research downstream. Nelson (2004) argues that 
fundamental knowledge from science, even if it is in 
fields of research with semi-immediate application, 
must remain open to public use. There is evidence 
that firms demand exclusive rights in the form of 
patents, or secrecy when they interact with PROs 
(e.g. Godfrey, 2005). For example, Blumenthal et al. 
(1996) claim that industrial partners are more likely 
to impose secrecy on universities than other partners 
would. Power asymmetries, which amplify the risks 
of privatisation, are frequently present in developing 
countries, especially in relation to intellectual prop-
erty rights claims if large and/or multinational cor-
porations are involved in the interactions. 
Fourthly, there is the issue of PRO accountability. 
When research agendas are decided autonomously 
by PROs, there is a risk of loss of accountability to 
funders (both government and private sector), which 
may derive in socially futile public research activi-
ties. Moreover, in PRO-I interactions, researchers 
may appropriate scientific results and start their own 
businesses, or they may act as brokers diffusing in-
formation to partner firms’ competitors, creating 
conflicts with the private funders. Nevertheless, be-
yond misbehaviour, there are also real uncertainties 
in the process of knowledge creation which promote 
conflicts in the distribution of responsibilities and 
duties (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga, 1994). 
Speculations about the relationship between chan-
nels and risks We can revise the four channels of 
interactions through critical reflection on the inten-
sity of different risks (summarised in Table 2). 
 Service channel: First, since this channel involves 
knowledge diffusion rather than knowledge crea-
tion, and under the assumption that researchers’ 
knowledge skills are strong, PRO that use this 
channel intensively may be subject to high oppor-
tunity costs (i.e. there may be socially more useful 
things in which to invest the researchers’ time). 
Secondly, since most of the knowledge trans-
ferred through this channel is mature, there is less 
risk of publicly produced knowledge becoming 
privatised. There is also a lower risk that conflicts 
of interest will emerge, although this can occur, 
especially if private funds obtained through this 
channel represent a large proportion of the PRO 
budget.  
 Traditional channel: This channel does not neces-
sarily require personal interactions with industry 
and it involves research activities which usually 
follow researchers/PRO own agenda. Thus, al-
though this channel does not imply any of the first 
Table 2. Expected intensity of risks for NSI as a whole, using different channels
Channels Risks 




Privatisation of  
public research 
Lack of accountability 
of PRO activities 
Service Medium High Medium Low 
Traditional Low Low Low High 
Bi-directional Medium Low High Medium 
Commercial High Medium High Low 
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three risks described above, there is a high risk of 
weak accountability of PRO research.  
 Bi-directional channel: The knowledge flows in 
both directions via this channel, and knowledge 
outputs are supposed to be created based on the 
contributions of all actors. In a context of power 
asymmetry, it constitutes a high risk of a privati-
sation of public research. However, opportunity 
costs would be expected to be low since research-
ers follow their intellectual motivations. Given 
that communication between the actors is frequent 
and permanent, this would seem to present only a 
medium risk of poor accountability on the part of 
the PRO, and of conflicts of interest.  
 Commercial channel: This is the channel most of-
ten identified in the literature as risky (especially 
in relation to start-ups and spin-offs).30 It clearly 
involves high risks of conflicts of interest, unethi-
cal behaviour and privatisation of publicly created 
knowledge. Since interactions through this chan-
nel usually require little personal interactions, 
mainly at the start of the relationship, opportunity 
costs are unlikely to be high, but this situation 
could change if researchers’ time is used to sup-
port newly born firms. 
Conclusion 
There are benefits and risks involved in PRO-I inter-
actions. The better they are balanced, the more effec-
tive will be the interaction in terms of upgrading the 
NSI. This paper proposes a conceptual framework 
that associates actors’ motivations for interacting, 
with channels of interaction. The main hypotheses 
derived from the framework associate channels with 
benefits. They can be summarised as follows: 
 H1: PRO-I interactions through the service chan-
nel produce predominantly economic benefits for 
PROs and contribute to short-term production ac-
tivities by firms. 
 H2: PRO-I interactions through the traditional 
channel produce predominantly intellectual bene-
fits for PROs and contribute to short-term produc-
tion activities by firms. 
 H3: PRO-I interactions through the bi-directional 
channel produce predominantly intellectual bene-
fits for PROs and contribute to long-term innova-
tion strategies by firms. 
 H4: PRO-I interactions through the commercial 
channel produce predominantly economic benefits 
for PROs and contribute to long-term innovation 
strategies by firms. 
These hypotheses are tested in the empirical papers 
in this special issue of Science and Public Policy, 
using a methodological approach presented in the 
Appendix to this paper.  
We also discussed how knowledge skills and in-
novative capabilities can act as mediating factors in 
the relation between channels and benefits. We 
would suggest that the better the innovative capabili-
ties of firms, the greater the effectiveness of all 
channels. Regarding researchers’ knowledge skills, 
in our view, they are required for more effective in-
tellectual benefits, especially for the bi-directional 
channel, but also to reap the economic benefits from 
the commercial channel. 
The final section in the main part of this paper 
proposes an extended version of the conceptual 
framework, which explores the extent to which 
PRO-I interactions could create social risks for the 
NSI as a whole. This discussion is particularly rele-
vant for policy-makers. Although we speculate about 
the relations between channels and type and inten-
sity of risks and argue that the commercial channel 
is the one which creates more intense social risks, 
further empirical research is needed to derive spe-
cific hypotheses, methodologies and empirical vali-
dation of the relation between channels and risks.  
We now highlight some policy challenges related 
to harnessing the potential of PRO-I interactions 
while not absorbing all the risk. First, PRO-I interac-
tions should be supported and regulated selectively. 
We argue that different channels of interactions bring 
about specific benefits and risks and claim that these 
relations are mediated by the specific skills of the ac-
tors. Thus, policy-makers should analyse the initial 
conditions of the actors involved in the interaction, 
assess the types of benefits to target and the risks to be 
avoided, and select policy tools to support specific 
channels of interaction under different conditions. 
Secondly, it is worth considering a division of  
labour in relation to PRO interaction activities to re-
duce the opportunity costs of the interaction, espe-
cially in terms of services. Instead of universities or 
top research institutes, specially designed public 
support institutions could be given the responsibility 
of diffusing mature knowledge through the service 
channel to all types of firms, including those with 
weak innovative capabilities. These new institutes 
could be responsible for diffusing traditional PRO 
research outputs, promoting internships for students, 
managing personnel exchanges etc. 
Thirdly, since traditional PRO-I interactions are 
led by market demand, which is not necessarily in 
line with the needs of the majority of the population, 
reward mechanisms should be created to promote re-
search aimed at solving social problems (health, 
housing, environmental) with weak commercial  
potential.  
Finally, there is an urgent need to limit the risk of 
privatisation of knowledge, and to avoid the ‘tragedy 
of the scientific commons’ (Nelson, 2004) that could 
occur if actors in trying to maximise their own bene-
fits, endanger the wider diffusion of (publicly created) 
knowledge. This risk arises mainly in relation to the 
commercial and the bi-directional channels and is par-
ticularly relevant in developing countries where large 
firms have better access than many PROs to intellec-
tual property rights mechanisms. 
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Notes 
1.  This paper is part of the project ‘Interactions between Univer-
sities and Firms: searching for Paths to support the changing 
role of Universities in the South (Africa, Asia and Latin Amer-
ica)’ financed by IDRC (Canada). This special issue of Sci-
ence and Public Policy discusses empirical findings for the 
four Latin American countries covered by this project. All the 
country contributions in this special issue were motivated by 
the conceptual discussion in the present paper and use the 
methodological approach in the Appendix to this paper. 
2.  E.g., three Argentinian scientists working in Argentinian 
PROs won Nobel Prizes for Science and a Mexican graduate 
from a public Mexican university won a Nobel Prize for Chem-
istry based on research conducted at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, USA. 
3.  See Dutrénit et al. (2010), López (2007) and Velho (2005). 
Nevertheless, PRO research has been and is key to success-
ful experience in some sectors in Latin America. Gutiérrez 
(1993), and León and Losada (2002) stressed the importance 
of PRO research for technological upgrading in Argentinian 
agriculture. Suzigan and Albuquerque (2009) studied the im-
portance of university research for the development of the 
aircraft, steel and agricultural industries in Brazil. 
4.  See Arocena and Sutz (2001, 2005), Bernasconi (2005) and 
Llomovatte et al. (2006).  
5.  See Dagnino and Velho (1998), Moori-Koenig and Yoguel 
(1998), Sorondo (2004) and Vega-Jurado et al. (2007).  
6.  See Arocena and Sutz (2005) and Casas et al. (2000).  
7.  See the country study papers in this special issue. Other col-
leagues use similar empirical sources to analyse PRO-I inter-
actions; i.e. Kruss (2009) for African studies and the special 
issue of the Seoul Journal of Economics, (2009) Vol. 22, No. 
4, for Asian studies.  
8.  See Arza (2005), Cimoli and Katz (2003) and Katz (2004). 
9.  See Arocena and Sutz (2005), Bernasconi (2005) and Vega-
Jurado et al. (2007). 
10.  See Azagra-Caro et al. (2006), Dasgupta and David (1994), 
Etzkowitz et al. (2005), Lopez-Martinez et al. (1994), Nelson 
(2004), Perkmann and Walsh (2008) and Slaughter and  
Leslie (1997). 
11.  See Lee (2000) and Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998). 
12.  See Lopez-Martinez et al. (1994) and Perkmann and  
Appendix: Proposed methodology for empirical validation of the conceptual framework 
In order to identify the determinants of the benefits 
we estimate two sets of equations: one for  
researchers and one for firms.  
Models 
Researchers 
_ i id V RV     (1a) 
i i i iIB Ch R      (1b) 
_ i id V RV     (1c) 
i i i iEB Ch R      (1d) 
Firms 
_ i id V FV     (2a) 
i i i iPB Ch F      (2b) 
_ i id V FV     (2c) 
i i i iInB Ch F      (2d) 
The conceptual framework suggests that different 
channels of interactions (Chi) have the potential to 
trigger different kinds of benefits, both for re-
searchers (intellectual benefit (IBi) and economic 
benefit (EBi) and for firms (benefit related to pro-
duction activities (PBi) and to innovation activities 
(InBi) (see Equations (1b), (1d), (2b) and (2d), re-
spectively). Moreover, there are other researcher 
and firm features (Ri and Fi, respectively) that may 
affect their benefits, which we include as control 
variables in the equations. These control variables 
are informed by the literature. 
The benefits, modelled by Equations (1b), (1d), 
(2b) and (2d), can only be measured for the  
 
researchers and firms that actually interact. These
researchers and firms may enjoy special charac-
teristics (which promote the interaction in the
first place). To deal with potential selection bias
we suggest the use of the Heckman two-step
method. For the selection part of each Heckman
model (Equations (1a), (1c), (2a) and (2c)), the
dependent variable (d_Vi) is a dummy variable
that equals one when the firm or researcher is
connected. The vectors of the independent vari-
ables in these equations are the features of re-
searchers (RVi) and firms (FVi) that affect their
probability of linking, and are also informed by
the literature. 
Since the selection part of the Heckman esti-
mates the inverse Mills ratio which corrects for se-
lection bias, we need first to identify the best 
possible model for selection. Different probit 
model specifications should be contrasted by as-
sessing the goodness of fit of the models (e.g. 
using the Bayesian information criterion). 
All the country studies in this special issue are 
based on surveys of researchers and firms. In the 
cases of Mexico and Argentina, both linked and 
unlinked researchers and firms are surveyed; in 
the case of Brazil only linked actors are included. 
Thus, it is not possible to estimate Heckman mod-
els in the Brazilian case. Costa Rica is a separate 
case with complete data on firms, but only linked 
researchers were surveyed. The authors of the 
papers in this special issue previously agreed on 
similar proxies for the key variables, such as the 
benefits and channels of PRO-I interactions. This 
allows the results to be compared, which is done 
in the final paper in this special issue. 
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Walsh (2008). 
13.  See Abramo et al. (2009) Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) 
and Ranga et al. (2003).  
14.  See Geuna (2001), Lee (2000), Mendoza (2007), Meyer-
Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) and Stephan and Everhart 
(1998). 
15.  See Etzkowitz and Klofsten (2005) and Etzkowitz and  
Leydesdorff (2000).  
16.  This figure was inspired in part by Kruss (2005), who organ-
ises firm and PRO imperatives for interaction in a four-by-four 
matrix. 
17.  See Dahlstrand (1999).  
18.  See Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994), Eun (2009), Romero 
(2007), Schartinger et al. (2002) and Vedovello (1997, 1998). 
19.  See Fritsch and Schwirten (1999), Perkmann and Walsh 
(2007) and Santoro and Saparito (2003). 
20.  See Romero (2007) and Wright et al. (2008). 
21.  See Bekkers and Freitas (2008) Cohen et al. (2002), Meyer-
Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) and Schartinger et al. (2002). 
22.  See Bekkers and Freitas (2008), Fukugawa (2005),  
Schartinger et al. (2002) and Vedovello (1997; 1998). 
23.  See Bekkers and Freitas (2008), Cockburn and Henderson 
(1998), Cohen et al. (2002) and D’Este and Patel (2007). In 
developing countries, in particular, consultancy is usually  
considered to be the most common form of PRO-I interaction. 
See Ojewale et al. (2001), Arocena and Sutz (2005), Kruss 
(2006) and Vega-Jurado et al. (2007). probably due to lack of 
demand from industry and financial pressures that lead PROs 
to search for new sources of funding. 
24.  There are some exceptions such as studies aimed at assess-
ing the relative effectiveness of channels; e.g. Wright et al. 
(2008), Adams et al. (2003) and Arvanitis et al. (2008), al-
though no systematic pattern of types of channels driving 
specific types of benefits has been proposed.  
25.  See Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994), Hanel and St-Pierre 
(2006), Laursen and Salter (2004) and Vedovello (1998). 
26.  See Blumenthal et al. (2006), Campbell and Blumenthal 
(1999) and Parkinson and Langley (2009). 
27.  See Florida (1999), Godfrey (2005), Lee (1996) and Mollis 
and Marginson (2002). 
28.  See Mansfield (1991, 1998). 
29.  See Blumenthal (1996), Campbell and Slaughter (1999) and 
Slaughter et al. (2002). 
30.  See Florida (1999) and Lee (1996). 
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